5, 255, 255);">Fourth, diplomacy and development are a crucial part of this equation. Just as we cannot function without partners, we cannot rely on military force while neglecting diplomacy and development. It is essential to recognize that Putinism will not be overcome by military force alone, and we must design our response accordingly to involve the whole of government. Economic development and the strengthening of civil society will be crucial in this fight, and we will also need to consider ways that our diplomatic and developmental efforts can be designed to counter Putinist tactics.

Through the work of the State Department and other federal agencies, we need to develop new mechanisms to strengthen freedom of the press, disseminate accurate information quickly and support effective ways to combat Putinist propaganda. We must educate the global public about the danger of Russian influence campaigns and how to respond to them, as well as support institution-building and anti-corruption efforts now that they are urgent security issues. Efforts to get money out of politics, secure electoral systems and police opaque financial flows will be important. In addition to supporting robust State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets for governance and democracy, initiatives such as potentially expanding the number of countries in the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s candidate country pool — which by its mandate invests in poverty reduction for those countries that score sufficiently high enough on indicators like rule of law and anti-corruption — may assist these efforts.

Fifth, if we wish to prevent Putinism from succeeding in its efforts to portray representative democracy as a failed governmental system and to prey upon social discontents, one of the first orders of business is to ensure our countries have healthy economies that support broad-based opportunities. Statist crony capitalism is an inherently weak economic model, but if we do not keep the social compact strong and deliver equitable growth in our own countries, as analysts of Putinism note, it offers an opening for Putinism to achieve its goal of “strengthening the perception of the dysfunction of the Western democratic and economic system” and “weaken[ing] the European Union and the West’s desirability, credibility, and moral authority.”

Indeed, the imperative to prove that American society had to deliver on its promises played a major role in our Cold War–era strategy to contain and outlast the Soviet Union. As George Kennan, the architect of that containment strategy, explained, the competition with the Soviets was “a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problem of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among major ideological currents of the time.” The ultimate lesson, he wrote, was that “[t]o avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions.” Making government and society work for the people is always critical, but in this contest it is even more imperative.

Finally, in addition to economics, we must also recognize that a program to counter Putinism will require new modes of domestic resistance. We must strengthen our societies against Putinist tactics that use the openness of our systems and our commitment to rules and procedural norms against us. “Gray zone” Putinist tactics, by operating below the threshold of open conflict and concrete response, strain our conceptual capacity to recognize and mitigate them before it is too late. Because most representative democracies are not habituated to these methods, and because many of these threats are deliberately ambiguous, we have not yet developed robust norms, concepts and institutions that would help us meet this challenge.

In hindsight, it is clear that the threat of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election merited a more robust response than U.S. officials adopted at the time. We must strive to ensure that the new insights we develop about such threats are translated into new ideas and new policies that provide effective responsive capabilities. As we do this, we must welcome the wealth of experience that our allies and partners are also developing as they confront similar threats worldwide.

For example, even though Russian actors funded multiple candidates vying for the 2017 French presidential election and apparently launched a massive hacking effort to hurt President Emmanuel Macron on the eve of the voting period, French voters understood the threat and they were not caught off-guard by the intervention. There is much to be learned by these and similar experiences in highlighting, naming, shaming and inculcating the populace and the press to the gravity of the threat. Potential approaches run the gamut of activity from sanctions to cyber efforts to public education to coordination with private organizations such as Facebook, Twitter and traditional news organizations. Developing and spreading these antibodies will be one of our most pressing tasks as we seek to combat this new danger.

Over the long run, if we can formulate these policy approaches, we stand a good chance of countering the advantages of our Putinist opponents and winning the ideological competition. As we did in the previous century, we can best this new challenge while renewing our values, and build a better world in the process.

Read the full article in TIME here: http://time.com/4836051/congress-russia-election-interference-opportunity/